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VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION OF WOMEN AS A RIGHT
PETER R. FORBES*
ONTRACEPTION IN the United States is an ever-increasing part of
the national scene. Although we have not yet felt the bite of
either the world over-population or the reproductive explosion in
this country, if everyone married and had only two children, the popu-
lation would double in a generation. Regardless of conscious awareness
of the problem, most Americans use some technique to avoid or defer
pregnancy. Simple techniques such as rhythm, withdrawal, or coitus
while lactating have a high failure rate and many women are dismayed
to have infants in rapid succession. Mechanical barriers erected by
condoms, diaphragms, jellies and foams have a lower but still signi-
ficant failure rate. The intrauterine devices, of assorted plastic or
metal design, have no patient error except failure to report expulsion,
but all have a greater or lesser method failure of roughly three
pregnancies per one hundred women each year. Such devices also have
a morbidity rate associated with hemorrhage or infection and an oc-
casional reported death. The contraceptive pills, of varying chemical
formulae, are a striking success. As a rule of thumb, no one gets preg-
nant on the pill, and responsibility for conception can usually be laid
at the patient's door. However, the side effects can be miserable. In
the short run, one sees nausea, easy weight gain, fluid retention and
bloating, breakthrough bleeding, facial pigmentation and a tendency
to fungus infection of the vagina. Long run side reactions include
severe headache, personality changes of irritability and depression,
and possible intravascular clotting defects. Fortunately, these are re-
versible upon discontinuing the medication. None of the preceding
techniques is both reliable for contraception and free from danger,
and therefore, more particularly, all are unsuitable for families where
a decision has been made to terminate childbearing permanently.
Voluntary surgical sterilization is a permanent approach which can
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be performed upon either men or women. The operation upon a man,
vas ligation, is a quick and simple office procedure, but it has several
disadvantages. First, coitus should not be performed until no sperm
can be seen in the ejaculate under the microscope. Secondly, recanaliza-
tion of the vas deferens with the re-establishment of fertility is a slim
possibility. Thirdly, men who remarry after their spouses' death or
after divorce seem to favor younger childless women who want to
conceive and surgical anastomosis of the cut vas, particularly after
three or four years, carries a low success rate for pregnancy even when
sperm are present, as they are usually in markedly diminished num-
bers. Finally, men are often emotionally unstrung by the surgery.
Confusing fertility, virility and masculinity, otherwise indolent hus-
bands feel compelled to lift weights, wear crew cuts, jog, and flex
their muscles to demonstrate their equality with men who can still
impregnate their wives.
Women, on the other hand, are much more sensible from a psy-
chological point of view. They do not usually confuse the feminine
role with reproductive capacity after they have given birth to a num-
ber of children. By the time they seek relief from their physician, they
have already decided that they want no more offspring, even if be-
cause of death or divorce they were to remarry. They do, however,
in most of the states face a legal stone wall. Three states expressly
prohibit voluntary elective sterilization except for medical indica-
tions.1 Forty-four states have no law, except statutes relating to in-
voluntary sterilization, which are not pertinent to this discussion.
Only a few states have legislation that provides a procedure to obtain
the voluntary operation.2 The purpose of this article is to explore the
rationale behind the lack of availability of doctors and hospitals for
the sterilization surgery and suggest a remedy under the law to alle-
viate that vacuum.
Technically, the surgical sterilization of a woman is more difficult
than that of a man because it involves entering the abdominal cavity,
either through the abdominal wall or in the upper reaches of the
vagina. The former method is the simplest if done immediately at the
time of delivery, using the same anesthetic. A small inch long incision
1 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 17-19, 53-33 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 76-149
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10 (1953).
2 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to 35-57 (1966); VA. CoDE AN. §§ 32-423 to
32-427 (1950).
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in the midline or in the transverse crease of the umbilicus will suffice
for exposure to cut and tie the fallopian tubes, preventing, simultane-
ously, access of the sperm to the egg proximally and of the egg to the
sperm distally. The vaginal approach is done through a colpotomy in-
cision and may be used after the uterus has shrunk to a size too
small for easy access through the abdominal wall, which may occur some
days or some weeks after delivery. Both approaches carry a morbidity
rate if not performed with great care, due to hemorrhage from the large
blood vessels close to the tube, or due to infection. There is even a
method failure rate of about one per cent where the cut tube opens and
allows passage of the sperm or ovum. Nevertheless, tubal ligation is the
better method for surgical sterilization of women, if performed at de-
livery and under the same anesthetic used for childbirth. It is fast
(usually less than twenty minutes operating time) and ninety-nine per
cent sure. Such surgery does not prolong hospital stay and eliminates
patient failure with minimum subsequent morbidity. In actual practice,
however, tubal ligation is difficult for the patient to secure because of
resistance by physicians and hospitals in the states which have no legis-
lative guide lines.
In most hospitals, a doctor with a patient who wants a tubal liga-
tion performed with delivery must submit the evaluation of the case
to a committee of physicians. Such committee is usually a combined
therapeutic abortion-sterilization committee which immediately sets
the tone. Because the two are equated, there is an unfortunate blend-
ing of the moral problems of abortion with an unrelated technique of
family planning. Most of the board doctors are quite reluctant to ac-
cept an opinion on the part of the woman, her husband and her doc-
tor that for socio-economic reasons alone the couple wants no more
children. They will reject most proposals out of hand for unstated or
obscure reasons. When the reasons are mentioned for rejecting appli-
cants they include age, total number of pregnancies, "not enough"
living children, possible improvement of economic level, possible death
of a living child, and regret of loss of reproduction with present or subse-
quent marriage. The committee members often suggest a vas ligation
for the husband because that does not appear in the hospital records
since it is done in a private physician's office and almost never as an
in-patient case. They often will suggest that the couple return to con-
ventional contraceptives that have failed in the past, without consider-
ing that an additional mouth to feed dilutes the material support of the
parents proportionately and creates economic injury. This dilution
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could be enough to create a public charge at a time when we are inter-
ested in diverting public support of families from its spiral of increase.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has rec-
ommended socio-economic sterilizations on an age/parity (number of
children) ratio of 5 children at 25 years of age, 4 at 30 years, and 3
at 35 years. Befor~e these guidelines were published, I had a patient
who at age 29 wished a tubal ligation with the birth of her sixth living
child and was denied by a sterilization committee because she had no
medical illness. This is typical in hospitals that have not changed to
or do not use the A.C.O.G. suggestions. At the other end of the spec-
trum, there are hospitals using such standards where because the
patient does not fit the age-parity criteria, intellectual dishonesty is
widely practiced. Minimal medical problems such as varicose veins are
inflated to become medical indications for sterilization. Or a hysterec-
tomy is done some weeks after childbirth for "prolapse of the uterus."
This is literally a falling out of the uterus as if the vagina had begun
to turn inside out like the finger of a glove. Many of these cases have
no requisite relaxation of pelvic supports nor other clear indication for
surgery, and are done primarily for sterilization, substituting the low
morbidity technique of tubal ligation for one with much higher mor-
bidity and even mortality.
Here is the quandary: We assume everyone has the "right" to marry
and procreate. Can we not assume that the adult woman of sound mind
with the consent of her spouse has the right not to procreate? Since
tubal ligation is a surgical procedure quite like any other, how can one
justify the attitude of the doctors sitting in commitee, who feel they
can tell the patient that she may not decide to turn off her reproductive
capacity by this means? The fact is that they do so tell her, without
any direction from the American Hospital Association, the American
Medical Association, their own hospitals (except where religion pro-
hibits such operation), or the legislature of their states.
There exists a remedy. If a patient were to apply well in advance of
delivery, setting forth her knowledge of the availability of alternative
contraceptive techniques and of the possible method of failure of the
operation, requesting with the consent of her husband for socio-eco-
nomic reasons only a surgical sterilization following the impending
birth, and the request were rejected, action could and should be insti-
tuted in the state courts for relief. The nature of the action or pro-
ceeding would be determined by the procedural laws of the jurisdiction.
Relief from capricious and arbitrary action by the medical commit-
1969]
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tees would seem to be available by virtue of the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,8 establishing the constitu-
tional protections afforded by the ninth amendment and by the due
process clause of the fourteenth. The lines of reasoning in the court
opinion reversing the Connecticut contraception law were diverse, but
to my non-legal mind, the several routes followed were orderly and
sequential in arriving at the same conclusion. The first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution were presented as spelling out certain rights,
which have been broadened to include certain other "rights" by prior
decisions of the court. The first route, pursued by Mr. Justice Douglas,
implied that a law forbidding the use of a contraceptive violates the
married couple's right of privacy as protected under the first amend-
ment, has a "destructive impact upon their relationship, '4 and "sweeps
unnecessarily broadly."5 Mr. Justice Harlan did not agree with this,
but felt that the Connecticut law infringed upon the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment by violating basic values "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."6 Mr. Justice White similarly felt that the
fourteenth amendment was infringed.
The opinion of Justice Goldberg, with Justices Warren and Brennan
concurring, was even more germane to the present discussion. Justice
Goldberg contended that a law outlawing voluntary birth control
"would unjustifiably intrude on rights of marital privacy which are
constitutionally protected." 7 Such reasoning was based on a previous
Court decision which held that among the rights not spelled out in the
first eight amendments is "the right.., to marry, establish a home and
bring up children,"" thus confirming marital privacy as constitutionally
protected. The protection is additionally extended by the ninth amend-
ment, which reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." Further, Justice Goldberg's evaluation of the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was that the first eight amendments did
not exhaust the basic fundamental rights guaranteed to the people.
8 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4 Id. at 485.
5Id.
Id. at 500; see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
7 Supra note 3, at 497.
8 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as
the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed
in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the
Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. 9
Since the fourteenth amendment has been held to prohibit the states
from abridging fundamental personal liberties, this application of the
ninth would similarly protect penumbral rights from state infringement.
"The entire fabric of the Constitution and purposes that clearly under-
lie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy
and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as
the fundamental rights specifically protected."'" If one believed that
marital privacy was not protected from infringement, state legislatures
would be free to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens.
This argument is hypothetically advanced to include the possible pas-
sage of a law demanding sterilization after two children, which the
Court holds to be a shocking violation of personal liberty.
Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary
birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requir-
ing compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. . . . [B]oth types of
law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitu-
tionally protected."
Accordingly, if the Supreme Court believes that a law preventing
voluntary birth control, in the absence of compelling state interest, is
unconstitutional and violates fundamental human rights, a suit in the
state courts would be similarly decided against a hospital committee
which usurped legislative function by denying a petitioner a voluntary
surgical sterilization. This would leave the field clear for state legis-
latures to enact laws spelling out the procedural techniques. A model
law would hopefully include: requirements for initial application some-
time in advance of delivery, allowing a cooling off period; an informed
consent in non-technical language, detailing possible failure of the pro-
cedure; alternative methods of family limitation; and a clear statement
that usually the patient will never again be able to have a child. Under
these circumstances, the law would then prohibit doctors and hospitals
from barring a voluntary surgical sterilization upon a patient.
9 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
lo Id. at 495.
11Id.
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